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Abstract 
This article examines the challenges of functional adaptation faced by the police in 
response to technologically driven changes in the nature of crime. It also recounts how 
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research under the auspices of a ‘dark web’ research project resulted in a search for an 
effective approach to engaging with investigators dealing with cybercrime. In doing so it 
tested, as a research methodology, a standard change implementation tool (problem tree 
analysis) from the Disaster Management and Sustainable Development (DMSD) discipline. 
This in turn resulted in significant consideration being given to the physical space in which 
that methodology is used. It presents the results of a workshop held with cybercrime 
investigators (not all were police officers) in terms of the importance of four key 
organisational and cultural issues (management, leadership and institutional ethos within 
the police; the risks of over-complication and exaggerated distinctions between cyber and 
real world policing; ethics; and knowledge, training and development) alongside the 
development and acquisition of new technical capabilities. 
 
Key words 
Cybercrime policing, police organisation, police culture, problem tree analysis, functional 
adaptation 
 
1. Introduction 
This article describes and reflects upon the initial stages of UK empirical research 
undertaken as part of an international research project into the policing of The Onion 
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Router (TOR) network.1 TOR is an easily accessible internet browser and a location for 
hidden services (market places and internet fora via TOR web sites) drawing upon 
anonymity as a core user requirement. Used correctly it offers users the ability to search 
the open web without revealing identity, but also to publish web services/sites known as 
Tor Hidden Services (THS) anonymously, anonymity being powerfully protected. It is this, 
together with other such systems that make up what is usually referred to as the ‘Dark 
Web’. For reasons explained below when we describe the evolution of our research 
methodology, however, this study is concerned with two wider questions that confronted 
the research team early in its work and not with the TOR network itself.  
 
First, we needed to understand functional adaptation whereby core policing skills and an 
ethos forged in the physical world can respond to technologically driven criminological 
changes, in order to assess the interrelationship between policing of TOR, as a specialist 
area of cyber policing, and how criminal justice as a whole is adapting to the ‘digital’ or 
’post digital’ age.2  
 
 
1 Police Detectives on the TOR-network: A Study on Tensions between Privacy and Crime-Fighting funded by 
NordForsk, the Economic and Social Sciences Research Council (ESRC) and the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientific Research (NWO) for the research protect. See Brants, Johnson and Wilson in this issue. 
2 D.M. Berry, Critical Theory and the Digital (Bloomsbury: London, 2015); D.M. Berry, The Philosophy of 
Software: Code and Mediation in the Digital Age (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2016). 
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Understanding the challenges of police adaptation to deal with cybercrime through intrusive 
police activity and how the police seek to balance this through their ethical code in addition 
to respect for laws that protect human rights, is important for informing policy making and, 
thus, has a potentially high social value and impact. However, the new knowledge creation 
required to achieve this, first requires an understanding of the contextual situation, 
including how institutional culture will influence organisational and individual cooperation, 
and of the wider environment that has a significant impact on the problems being 
examined. Both the varied professional (pre-academic) experience of the research team (a 
former police officer, Home Office official, journalist and practising barrister) and the 
existing academic literature provided important starting points in this endeavour, but we 
considered that the research process needed to be grounded in the reality of cybercrime 
investigators. 
 
The second question that needed to be resolved was to identify an effective approach 
that would enable us to explore, with police officers, the process of adaptation required 
to respond to cybercrime. We had recognised from the outset that our approach needed 
to be time-efficient for police officers who agreed to assist with our work and should also 
offer them something in return for their time. As indicated later this became a matter 
hopefully of the research team becoming ‘givers’ as well as ‘takers’. 
 
Unusually, but perhaps because the research team both within the UK and internationally 
is multi-disciplinary, it was decided to test an issue likely to be rarely (if ever) encountered 
within criminal justice research literature. We decided to test the suitability for criminal 
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justice empirical research of a change implementation planning tool (problem tree 
analysis) used in Disaster Management and Sustainable Development (DMSD) work and 
also to assess the significance of the physical space in which the workshop was held for 
the effectiveness of the methodology used. 
 
This article is organised in five main sections. Section 2 explains the research context. 
Section 3 looks briefly (certainly not comprehensively) at the challenges of functional 
adaptation to technologically driven changes, such as cybercrime, within criminal justice. 
Section 4 explains our methodology and the significance of space when planning this 
research, our initial scoping studies and a workshop with investigators held in 2019. In 
essence the development of our approach is an account of how we sought to reduce 
significant risks of potential bias and overcome knowledge generation barriers, often 
encountered when researching effectively closed groups such as the police. The results of 
the workshop are then presented and discussed in the next section. That offers both a 
general overview of what emerged at the workshop and a more detailed discussion of 
four key issues (management, leadership and organisational ethos within the police; the 
risks of over complication and exaggerated distinctions between cyber and real world 
policing; ethics; and knowledge training and development). Our conclusions summarise 
what has been achieved using this approach to empirical research that will be subject 
(Covid-19 permitting) to refinement and hopefully extension to other criminal justice 
specialisms within the remaining period of this research project. 
 
2. The research context  
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The TOR network has been described and explored extensively from a technological 
perspective3. Biryukov et al,4 having examined a significant selection of TOR hidden services 
(THS), concluded that the volume of sites supporting what in any legal jurisdiction is likely to 
amount to criminal activity was very similar to those serving what would only be regarded 
as illegal activity under the laws of an authoritarian state, such as the protection of freedom 
of fundamental rights through its facility to hide a whistle-blower’s identity, ensure the 
 
3 C.Guitton, ‘A Review of the Available Content on Tor Hidden Services: The Case against Further 
Development’, Computers in Human Behavior (2013) 29 2805–15 
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.07.031>; A. Biryukov and others, ‘Content and Popularity Analysis of Tor 
Hidden Services’, Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 30-June-20 
(2014), 188–93 <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2014.20>; E. Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, 
Anonymity and Online Policing, Global Commission on Internet Governance (London, 2015) 
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2667711>; C. Nath and T. Kriechbaumer, The Darknet and Online Anonymity, 
Postnote 488 (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology: London, 2015); D. S. Dolliver, S. P. Ericson, and 
K. L. Love, ‘A Geographic Analysis of Drug Trafficking Patterns on the TOR Network’, Geographical Review, 
(2016)  <https://doi.org/10.1111/gere.12241>; J. Van Buskirk et al., ‘Who Sells What? Country Specific 
Differences in Substance Availability on the Agora Cryptomarket’, International Journal of Drug Policy (2016) 
35 16 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.07.004>; A. Nastuła, ‘New Threats in the Cyberspace Based on 
the Analysis of the TOR (The Onion Router) Network.’, ASEJ Scientific Journal of Bielsko-Biala School of Finance 
and Law, (2019) 22 28 <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.9839>. 
4A. Biryukov and others, ‘Content and Popularity Analysis of Tor Hidden Services’, Proceedings - International 
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 30-June-20 (2014) 
188.<https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2014.20> ;.H. Haughey, G. Epiphaniou and H. M Al-Khateeb, ‘Anonymity 
networks and the fragile cyber ecosystem’ (2016) 3 Network Security 10. 
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anonymity of journalistic sources, circumvent state censorship and, even in a liberal society, 
offer protection to victims of digital-abuse or stalking. This is because TOR draws upon 
anonymity as a core user requirement. In addition to offering users the ability to search the 
open web without revealing identity, THS offers scope to run services and publish 
information on hidden digital platforms. TOR and THS, therefore, are vitally important cyber 
resources in the face of the intensifying level of surveillance of surface web activity by 
authoritarian regimes and the rising tide of authoritarianism that has even infected EU 
countries, such as Hungary. Hence, the highly sensitive policing of ACNs in a democratic 
society needs to be transparent, accountable and ethical as well as lawful. We believe that 
this will be well served, inter alia, through a trusted and effective dialogue between 
academia and those who do the policing (this extends beyond police forces). 
 
The downside (or dark side) of the TOR network is that, because anonymity is powerfully 
protected, it offers major opportunities for criminal activity. This ranges from market sites 
selling products (drugs, passports, identification documents etc.) or services (violence, 
intrusive activity, child pornography, money laundering etc.) to anonymous forums allowing 
information and digital image or document exchange for criminal purposes, or of a criminal 
nature. Frustrating such criminal activity is an important objective for all democratic states 
and for this reason also we believe that a dialogue between academia and the police is 
essential as the criminal justice system responds with increasingly intrusive police activity to 
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counter ever increasing volumes of cybercrime.5 In our view this is a matter of great societal 
importance that policing (or civilian policing to give it sufficient emphasis) is successful in 
achieving functional adaptation within the criminal justice system to avoid any overreach by 
state security or intelligence services. 
 
3. The challenges of functional adaptation 
 
Whether we are in a digital or post-digital world, challenges to policing and the criminal 
justice system will stem from technological development. They did so in the last few 
decades of the 20th century with rising vehicle thefts, and the system adapted very 
successfully by adapting an old approach to new circumstances. Car manufacturers were 
suitably influenced by the Home Office Car Theft Index to enhance vehicle security at the 
design stage, 6 almost mirroring the realisation, centuries earlier, of the value of bolts and 
bars to make houses safer.  
 
Rising crime trends, especially cross-jurisdictional offending, have been conventionally 
ascribed to comparatively new and, from a global north perspective, inexpensive digital 
 
5 See Davies in this issue for hacking etc. by police and intelligence services. 
6 G. Houghton, Car Theft in England and Wales: The Home Office Car Theft Index (Home Office: London, 1992); 
J. Sallybanks and R. Brown, Police Research SeriesPaper 119: Vehicle Crime Reduction: Turning the Corner 
(Home Office: London, 1999). 
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technologies. Technology and science, as Andreas notes, is ‘double edged’, having equally 
assisted the police.7 Modern crime scene investigation policing is inconceivable without 
fingerprints and forensic DNA analysis and the databases that facilitate the rapid sharing of 
information by investigators throughout most of Europe and the other wealthier regions of 
the world.8 House of Commons Hansard record of 1967 reveals a range of significant issues 
troubling UK Police Forces at that time, from recruitment to resources to patrol activities.  
One interesting note was provided by Roger Cooke, MP: ’We must also adopt modern 
computer methods.’ mentioning computerisation used by Chicago Police analysts to predict 
crime hot spots.9 
 
This should not distract from a general pattern of how all participants in the legal system, 
certainly not just the police, often find it difficult to adapt scientific and technological 
advances. Sometimes this is understandable because initial scientific or technological claims 
may not be as reliable for probative purposes as may have been originally claimed. This has 
 
7 P. Andreas, ‘Illicit Globalisation: myths and Misconceptions’ in (eds) V. Mitsilegas, P. Alldridge and L. Cheliotis, 
Globalisation, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Hart, Oxford, 2017) 55-56. 
8 See: T.J Wilson, ‘Criminal Justice and Global Public Goods: The Prüm Forensic Biometric Cooperation Model’ 
(2016) 80 The Journal of Criminal Law 303–326 and T.J. Wilson, ‘The Implementation and Practical Application 
of the European Investigation Order in the United Kingdom: An Academic Perspective’ in (ed.) Á. Gutiérrez 
Zarza Los avances del espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia de la UE en 2017: II Anuario de la Red Española 
de Derecho Penal Europeo (ReDPE) (Wolters Kluwer edit: Madrid, 2018). 
9  HC Deb 9 February 1967, vol 740 col 1876. 
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been extensively documented for forensic DNA10 and similarly the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) had to step in to moderate the original databasing excesses allowed 
under English law.11 Even more fundamental problems were identified by Piasecki and 
Davies when their research exposed the extent to which significant numbers of defence 
counsel had failed to appreciate their duties, even when clearly stated in the Criminal 
Procedure Rules and Practice Directions,  in respect of the reliability (or not) of expert 
scientific evidence.12 
 
In addition to the challenge of adaptation to technologically and scientifically driven 
changes in crime and the work of criminal justice system, there are particular issues of 
engagement and trust that are relevant to our research. The Police Service is constantly 
challenged over its activities through significant media coverage of events, often negatively 
 
10 M Lynch, SA Cole, R McNally and K Jordan, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting 
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2008) and DH Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence (Harvard 
UP: Cambridge MA, 2010). 
11 S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008], ECHR 1581, resulting eventually in the reforms achieved with the 
enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
12 G. Davies and E. Piasecki, ‘No more Laissez Faire? Expert Evidence, Rule Changes and Reliability: Can more 
effective training for the legal profession and judiciary prevent miscarriages of justice?’ (2016) 80 The Journal 
of Criminal Law 364. 
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with significant internal and public impact. 13 Ethical research of or with the police presents 
problems for social science 14, particularly over informed consent, confidentiality and 
anonymity, and these problems are intensified  by the exceptionally strong hierarchical 
management structures and rigid regulatory conditions of police employment. Police 
culture itself has received a great deal of academic attention over the years 15 and has been 
categorised in several ways, not least of which is a defensiveness  due partly to issues of 
required professional confidentiality but also of collegiate and self-protection. Coupled with 
the contemporary, yet increasingly topical issue of financial cutbacks leading to limited 
availability and resourcing, it is understandable that devoting time to academic researchers 
is generally of low priority for policing purposes. 
 
 
13 E. R Maguire, S. D. Mastrofski, and M. D. Reisig, The Public Image of the Police, Final Report to The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (Manassas, 2001); R. Sela-Shayovitz, ‘Police Legitimacy under the 
Spotlight: Media Coverage of Police Performance in the Face of a High Terrorism Threat’, Journal of 
Experimental Criminology (2015) 11 17  <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-014-9213-8>. 
14 L. Skinns, A. Wooff, and A Sprawson, ‘The Ethics of Researching the Police: Dilemmas and New Directions’, in 
Introduction to Policing Research: Taking Lessons from Practice (Routledge:  Abingdon, 2015)1–256.. 
15 H. Campeau, ‘“Police Culture” at Work: Making Sense of Police Oversight’, British Journal of Criminology, 
(2015) 55 669  <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azu093>; R. E. Worden and S. J. McLean, ‘Police Departments as 
Institutionalized Organizations’, in Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy (ed.) R. 
Worden and S. McLean (Berkeley : University of California Press., 2017) 14. 
<https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.30.b>; S. Holdaway, ‘The Re-Professionalisation of the Police in England and 
Wales’, Criminology and Criminal Justice (2017) 17 588. 
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Arguably from a civil society perspective such engagement is important as the police 
increasingly become involved in intrusive surveillance of the online lives led increasingly 
across society. Understanding the difficulties that the police face in adapting to investigating 
crime in cyberspace is important for keeping such offending within the domain of criminal 
justice with its Convention right to fair trial and privacy safeguards (albeit not always 
effective), where coercion is imposed in a transparent and challengeable process and data 
storage policies and use of machine learning are open to challenge by any group of citizens 
through judicial review. If the police lose responsibility for leading the response to 
cybercrimes, there are more shadowy arms of the state that will find functional adaptation 
to threats in cyberspace easier. All that has to be done is to ‘integrate the collection of 
personal data and the analysis of these digital traces into their repertoire of activities’.16 
Ultimately, however, it has to be acknowledged that achieving the right level of engagement 
with the Police to undertake impactful and critical social science research is difficult. Putting 
aside available time in this discussion, the Police find themselves almost constantly under 
external attack as well as being within an institution that actively investigates their own. 
Trust is a major issue and trust with external researchers needs to be fostered before 
genuine engagement is forthcoming.  
 
3.Project Methodology 
 
16 D. Bigo ad L Bonelli, ‘Digital Data and The Transnational Intelligence Space’ in (eds. D. Bigo, E. Isin and E. 
Ruppert) Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights (Routledge: London, 2019) 100-101. 
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(a) The significance of understanding the dynamism inherent in the space in which 
functional adaptation is taking place  
Our research is concerned with how the police in England and Wales are operating (in an 
investigatory manner) within the digital arena, and establishing how far along the ‘digital 
world’ epoch development timeline they are. In other words what progress is being 
achieved in the functional adaptation of a role and an ethos forged and undergoing 
continuous development in parameters largely set in the physical world and not in cyber 
space. 
 
Policing cybercrime requires adaptation to criminal justice in a quite different type of 
location increasingly affecting our daily lives, also, as a consequence, takes us into a new 
kind of legal space that is subject to regulation17 and may also have to be policed. The digital 
environment that manifests that legal space, unlike the physical world, however, is almost 
constantly and rapidly reconfigured by technological developments or how the possibilities 
offered by technological change are rapidly exploited in novel and unanticipated ways, both 
positively and negatively. For example, the technology that even during the Covid-19 
pandemic can keep grandparents and grandchildren in contact can be commercially 
exploited by criminals that live-stream vicious acts of child abuse.18 
 
17 C. Reed and A. Murray, Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2018)   
18 See Wilson in this issue. 
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In writing about the ‘Information age’ or ’the Digital Age’ from the 1970’s onwards, Berry 
depicts how the development of digital platforms and shifted economic wealth creation that 
came from industrial production increasingly to computerisation or processes dependent on 
computerisation (including artificial intelligence). In particular, he describes the intricacies 
and development of this digital age, while drawing attention also to the almost every day 
dynamic whereby the cyberspace of the digital age is transformed to a ‘post digital age’. 
While the digital age was often specifically or narrowly associated with the physical locality 
of user and hardware, in the post digital age interconnected computing is pervasive and 
ubiquitous. 19 Users are no longer generally tied to known and relatively static physical 
locations in order to listen to a music CD, watch a DVD or send an email from a desktop. 
Instead, society is becoming increasingly reliant on the underlying computational code to 
create a space formed by computational activity within which information is increasingly 
created, analysed, disseminated and more. The geography of the digital world has 
progressed away from physical anchors that can be found on conventional maps to 
cartography of the new digital age. Traditional physical boundaries and specific locations 
have less significance, especially traditional legal jurisdictions in which devices, content, 
actions, intentions, the profits of criminal acquisition and consequences are physically 
located and vulnerable to real world policing at critical stages of criminal activity, such as 
when the proceeds of cybercrime are transferred into potentially tangible assets via banking 
money or purchasing land ownership or other high value assets. We envisage in the post 
 
19 D.M. Berry (2015 and 2016), above n. 6.  
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digital age that criminal vulnerability to jurisdictionally based police intervention will be 
increasingly reliant on cyber technology rather than, for example, a monitored illegal 
delivery. For example, the only way to acquire evidence about access to extreme child 
abuse may be to undertake bulk data surveillance to find information about bank account 
payments linked to money transfers linked to that site.20 Equally, the suggested post-digital 
age of Berry poses questions on the understanding of computational code. Expertise is 
moving from the subject/topic to coding. The subject expert is now using advancing 
technology (computational code) that analyses, creates, manipulates and synchronises 
his/her data but can that expert explain how that is happening and why the code makes 
certain decisions? 
Berry’s imagining of a post-digital age is supported by the International Data Corporation 
(IDC) ‘… unlike the physical universe, the digital universe is created and defined by software, 
a man-made construct.’21 ‘And it is software that will both create new opportunities and 
new challenges for us as we try to extract value from the digital universe that we have 
created.’22. It would be a mistake, therefore, to see the process of adaptation as simply an 
 
20 See Wilson in this issue for NCA and GCHQ joint work on such investigations.. 
21  D.M. Berry (2016), above n. 6;:.IDC, The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing 
Value of the Internet of Things, 2014 <https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/internet-
of-things.htm> accessed 22 January 2020. 
22 D.M. Berry, The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of 
Things. < https://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/internet-of-things.htm >accessed 20 
January 2020. 
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adjustment from policing a physical world in which devices and software are used in 
discernible physical legal locations, but one in which the police are adjusting by taking on a 
more significant digital role, but where their investigations have to deal with an 
environment that is itself being transformed from the digital or the post-digital age. 
 
Preliminary issues that have to be resolved for researching the policing of TOR therefore 
are(a) what is the internal UK policing context of investigating and dealing with digital crime, 
and (b) how are TOR investigations, as the most technically challenging investigations, 
impacted by the overall transformation of cyberspace?23 The remainder of this article is 
concerned with the first of these questions, which was more than enough for the first 
workshop. The second question has to wait (Covid-19 permitting) for the next phase of the 
research project. 
(b) The scoping work and our initial observations 
We engaged in a significant initial scoping exercise involving literature searches, document 
examination, research group meetings with various experts24 and conference (professional 
 
23 The first question is also relevant to the content of the other special issue articles, especially the 
interrelationship between cybercrime policing in general and TOR focused investigations considered in Davies 
and Wilsons’ articles. 
24 With the Forensic Science Regulator and a member of her staff, a private digital evidence service provider, a 
criminologist who has undertaken extensive empirical research into cybercrime and the NCA ethics advisory 
body. 
 17 
and academic) attendance, particularly at police focused and sponsored conferences.25 The 
National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) is the major sponsor of UK Police conferences and 
workshops, under arrangements where individual chief officers lead (as ‘portfolio holders’ 
of major work streams, several of which including cyber or digital policing issues. Because of 
the fragmented nature of police organisation in England and Wales,26 the NPCC seeks to 
provide national strategic development, although this coexists somewhat uneasily with the 
legal and political autonomy of chief constables and police and crime commissioners. To 
support the development of cyber surveillance in  policing the NPCC facilitate an annual 
conference open to other state agencies whose staff also engage in cyber surveillance and 
investigations (The Home Office Border Force, HM Revenue & Customs, the Ministry of 
Defence Police and others) and other professionals and academics. The conference is of 
considerable impact, has significant attendance and a diverse professional audience. 
Attendance at these dynamic and highly interactive events proved to be much more 
effective for scoping purposes than the originally planned programme of individual 
interviews. 
 
The scoping exercise resulted in two initial research findings about the situation in England 
and Wales: (a) police investigation of TOR activity is limited and extremely focused, 
justifiably, on high profile crime priorities such as terrorism or child abuse, and (b) TOR 
 
25 Chatham House Rule events sponsored by the NPCC on 22-25 October 2018 and 19-21 November 2019. 
26 See Brants et al. in this issue. 
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needs to be viewed within a cyber or digital environment that in general poses a diverse set 
of very significant scale, complexity, resource knowledge and proportionality issues to the 
police service. We found that: (a) in general, TOR and other ACNs were viewed as part of a 
more general set of problems created for the police by increasing anonymity throughout the 
web (the internet ‘going dark’ with encryption becoming a standard commercial offering for 
social media platforms) and (b) both policing activity and criminal behaviour was rarely 
compartmentalised within one level of the web (for example, the police need access to the 
‘deep web’ to trace bank accounts linked to dark web child pornography sites and sex 
grooming might begin on the surface web but then lure potential victims into anonymised 
communication platforms. 27 
 
TOR activity is undertaken through regional and national units, acknowledging the boundary 
problems inherent to digital crime. Geographically bound police forces are reluctant to 
investigate a matter where crime location cannot be held to be within their own geographic 
limits, so often the case with ‘knows no boundaries’ digital crime. Posting material on TOR, 
abusive images, forum messages, items or services via market places predominantly 
becomes intelligence material, attribution being almost impossible to determine 
evidentially. 
 
 
27 See the other contributions to this issue. 
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In 2019 Cressida Dick, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police gave a public lecture on 
the topic of digital policing. She explained that, while advances are being made to extend 
police technological capacity and capabilities, the sheer scale and complexity of digital data 
now being created presents a growing burden. As an example of scale by volume in major 
investigations Dick referred to how the multiple 2005 terrorist attacks in London (known as 
‘7/7’), resulted in the seizure of approximately 4 terabytes of data. In 2019 she explained 
that in just one of many hundreds of our CT [counter terrorism] investigations this year we 
have imaged 81 terabytes of data’. Whilst scale by volume is a difficulty, the emphasis given 
is to scale by data complexity and managing investigations of almost any type that now do, 
or could, involve a significant level of digital data as society becomes ever more data-reliant 
and data-integrated. She also expressed concern about the anonymity built into TOR, and 
increasingly other digital communication services.28 
 
The NPCC facilitated three short workshop sessions in 2018 for the research team to 
present the project and the initially proposed approach to research (conceived as a series of 
individual interviews with police officers) at their annual digital policing conference. Useful 
as part of the scoping exercise, the workshops exhibited factors that were important for 
identifying a methodology that might achieve positive engagement with police and 
regulatory body personnel. Little mention of TOR or other ACNs was made in the feedback 
 
28 C. Brogan, ‘Imperial College London’, London Police Commissioner Talks Digital Policing at Annual Imperial 
Lecture, 2019 <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/189089/london-police-commissioner-talks-digital-policing/> 
accessed 1 August 2019. 
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gained; the second theme of barriers to the digital ‘business as usual’ functionality of 
policing was predominant. 
 
Cumulatively the research team’s scoping exercise opened up our understanding of the 
contextual aspects of the barriers, professionally perceived or otherwise, to managing the 
functional adaptation of English policing to the increasingly cyber or digital world.  
 
(c) The switch to a the problem tree day workshop approach 
 
The research team was able to gain valuable insights from our initial engagement with the 
online investigatory world at the 2018 NPCC conference workshops,29 a conference open to 
non-police attendees, but with all the ambiance of a police professional venue and event, 
and therefore non-neutral ground. Such a professional facing biased environment 
potentially generates engaged participants as either ‘givers’ or ‘takers’. To be a successful 
‘taker’ the individual/group (researchers) must have, and display, both legitimacy and 
adequacy. Both, however, are factors that take time to develop with an audience when the 
void between audience and presenter is mismatched in terms of professional experience 
and knowledge. Whilst not negatively viewed the research team were seen as ‘takers’ but 
 
29 Similarly attendance at the 2019 equivalent event made it possible to calibrate the workshop results against 
what we heard during our second conference attendance and to give a short presentation about the workshop 
and other issues explored in our work that were relevant to conference discussions.  
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with little legitimacy or adequacy in that environment, a view that does not encourage non-
police attendees to be ‘givers’. The research team decided that it needed to seek to engage 
instead with professionals in a neutral, participatory and ethically managed environment in 
order to be ‘takers’ of valuable knowledge provided by fully empowered ‘givers’. 
 
Legitimacy and adequacy become significant perspectives to develop in any professional 
environment. Much has been made of the social worker feeling personally both legitimate 
and adequate to foster roles with drug or alcohol dependent clients. Legitimacy is often 
seen as built in to the profession, the legitimate reason for seeking engagement, but also 
reflects personally on the social worker believing he/she has the right to approach certain 
client issues. Adequacy is competency in the particular field in question and work has found 
that a lack of (perceived) legitimacy and/or adequacy can result in the social worker veering 
away from tackling certain client problems. 30 Baetens31 analyses the educational delivery of 
international criminal law across countries. Whilst looking at delivery, Higher Education 
staffing structures and other factors, the adequacy element to successful delivery is 
significant. In Higher Education both elements come to the fore with personal tutoring. To 
 
30 H. Loughran, M.Hohman, and D. Finnegan, ‘Predictors of Role Legitimacy and Role Adequacy of Social 
Workers Working with Substance-Using Clients’, British Journal of Social Work (2010) 40 239 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcn106>. 
31 F. Baetens and W. Ling Cheah, ‘Being an International Law Lecturer in the 21st Century: Where Tradition 
Meets Innovation’, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2013) 2 974 
<https://doi.org/10.7574/cjicl.02.04.140>. 
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the student and the lecturer adequacy and legitimacy are core factors of positive 
engagement.32 For research of Policing these perspectives interlink with the ‘givers’ and 
‘takers’ theme. 
 
Lessons learnt from the scoping exercise demanded a workshop approach that would be 
participatory in nature, foster significant stakeholder leadership in an environment that was 
professionally neutral for all involved and facilitated through an inclusive engagement tool. 
These four aspects were considered critical to the development of legitimacy, adequacy and 
therefore successful roles as ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ for all parties. 
 
A full day workshop was developed by drawing on methodologies predominantly from the 
discipline of Disaster Management and Sustainable Development (DMSD). Financial aid 
providers, e.g. for third world countries, such as United Nations agencies, USAid, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), and the European Commission follow a 
common path in their requirement for full aid funding applications. That path will invariably 
involve the use of Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) for project development and require 
certain analytical methods to be utilised. Strong emphasis is placed on stakeholder 
engagement throughout a project development process, and identifying the details of a 
problem to be tackled, including context, calls for the use of participatory Problem Tree 
 
32 M. Owen, ‘Sometimes You Feel You Are in Niche Time: The Personal Tutor System, a Case Study’, Active 
Learning in Higher Education (2002) 3 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1469787402003001002>. 
 23 
analysis. This in turn feeds in to the LFA to capture a fully understood and justified aid 
requirement. 33 Problem tree analysis generates participatory examination of an identified 
problem to seek the root causes and effects of those causes. It will often move on to 
objective and strategy tree analysis, identifying workable goals and delivery strategies. 34 
Problem tree analysis differs from cause and effect analysis (tending to focus upon the 
business environment) due to its ability to additionally examine conceptual and perception 
based problems. Dillon 35 provides an intuitive working guide to the process and summarises 
the positive as ‘The value of this type of assessment is greatest if it is carried out in a 
workshop with the stakeholders, giving the opportunity to establish a shared view of the 
situation’, so emphasising stakeholder engagement as a pre-requisite. Successful positive 
 
33 European Commission, Project Cycle Management Guidelines, Aid Delivery Methods, 2004 
<https://doi.org/ACE446 [pii]\r10.1111/j.1474-9726.2008.00446.x [doi]>; David Wield, ‘Tools for Project 
Development within a Public Action Framework’, Development in Practice,  (1999) 9 33 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09614529953197>; P. Crawford and P. Bryce, ‘Project Monitoring and Evaluation: A 
Method for Enhancing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Aid Project Implementation’ International Journal of 
Project Management  (2003) 21 363 <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00060-1>. 
34 AA Ammani, SJ Auta, and JA Aliyu, ‘Challenges to Sustainability: Applying the Problem Tree Analysis 
Methodology to the ADP System in Nigeria’, Journal of Agricultural Extension (2011) 14 35 
<https://doi.org/10.4314/jae.v14i2.64122>; P. Bruscoli, E. Bresci, and F. Preti, ‘Diagnostic Analysis of an 
Irrigation System in the Andes Region’ Agricultural Engineering International: The CIGR Journal of Scientific 
Research and Development, 3.February 2001  1. 
35 L. Barreto Dillon, ‘Step 1 : Problem Tree Analysis’, Problem Tree Analysis, 2017 1–5 
<https://sswm.info/taxonomy/term/2647/problem-tree-analysis> accessed 24 January 2019. 
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understanding of a problem to be resolved and the context within which it exists through 
collaboration with a range of key stakeholders is intuitively core to any disaster 
management or sustainable development project development. Problem Tree analysis 
becomes a high value context gathering tool in relatively wide use but rarely reported on 
outside of the disaster management or sustainable development themes.  
 
Focus on DMSD stakeholder-led participatory engagement, utilising Problem Tree Analysis 
as the discussion facilitator and setting a neutral environment resulted in positive 
engagement with the invited participants. A highly significant success factor was the venue 
chosen, displaying characteristics of: 
• a venue external to working practice for all participants 
• centrally located but discreet – so offering additional professional anonymity 
• friendly, accommodating ambience, 
• internal logistics providing a ‘closed group’ setting, e.g. separated internal area, 
controlled interruption potential. 
These features enabled the workshop venue to be considered professionally neutral and to 
mitigate aspects of potential contestation and professional bias, confirmed by subsequent 
feedback from participants: 
 ’I do also think that the neutral venue was conducive to open group discussion.’”36 
 
36 WS1 Participant Q.  
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 “’something that had a significant positive impact in creating the sense (as I saw it of 
collegiality)’37 
 
Ethical procedures, the researchers’ ability to confirm anonymity, project objectives and 
linked workshop goals were emphasised at the beginning of the workshop in some detail, 
setting out a professional but also institutionally safe opportunity to engage in candid 
discussion. In turn this approach provided the research with both legitimacy 
(acknowledgement of formalised ethical practice, legitimate project objectives and goals) 
and adequacy (researchers’ professional history and previous projects, workshop method 
adequate for objectives).38 
 
The Problem tree analysis approach requires a problem to be set and in this case the broad 
question of “What are the problems of policing in the digital age?” was put forward, 
ensuring discussion began openly with no pre-defined reference point, therefore prompting 
stakeholder-led participatory discussion. Generating strong participatory discussion was the 
second core factor in creating a successful workshop, so leading to the use of the Problem 
Tree analytical method as the facilitator of discussion. Participatory methods are recognised 
 
37 WS1 Participant M. 
38 L. Anđelković, ‘The Elements of Proportionality As a Principle of Human Rights Limitations’, Facta 
Universitatis, Series: Law and Politics (2017) 15 <https://doi.org/10.22190/fulp1703235a>. 
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within DMSD as capable of encouraging sharing of diverse perspectives, needs, knowledge 
and ideas. They empower participants, enhancing both individual and collective knowledge 
and creativeness to generate an improved product. 
 
By providing a firm framework to be followed (from a blank canvas) within a neutral 
environment after explanation of ethical practices and anonymity guarantees, the potential 
barriers surrounding perceptions of legitimacy and adequacy were successfully mitigated. As 
Participant M 39stated in workshop feedback:  
‘The problem tree process and the way that the process was managed to create trust 
encouraged (genuine and quite stark) frankness and also a sense of collegiality. I 
would like to stress the management point because of the advantage of facilitation 
by someone who is familiar with the participants’ mind-sets as well as the subject 
matter and methodology.’” 
One advantage within the research team (this remark originates with a co-author and not 
the corresponding author) was the style of facilitation, partly personal character and partly 
professional background. The day was led by someone who ‘speaks the language’ and 
indeed bears the same ‘scars on his back’. Not qualities that are easily replicable within 
many academic research teams. 
 
 
39 WS1 Participant M.  
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Suitable diversity of professional background was acknowledged within the workshop 
setting, with the invited attendees ranging from front line digital police investigators, mid 
and senior police managers, independent training providers, academics offering particular 
expertise, independent police consultants and a digital investigator from a non-police public 
sector.40 The workshop was facilitated by the corresponding author, assisted by the two co-
authors, who are now independent researchers. The themes discussed at the workshop 
were not pre-determined, introduced or suggested, all came from the participating non-
academic stakeholders, this ensuring that all themes were developed with integrity and in a 
manner that made it possible to indicate the comparative strength of each issue’s 
significance. Comprehensive contemporary notes of the discussions were recorded 
throughout. Anonymised copies were circulated to all attendees post-workshop, providing 
the opportunity for feedback, comments or potential correction. No disagreement with the 
final version of workshop notes was forthcoming. 
 
5. The Workshop: results and discussion  
 
 
40 The workshop was held on 12 June 2019 and was attended by 5 police cybercrime specialists, a NHS 
cybercrime specialist, the NPCC cyber surveillance project manager, a cyber policing ethics group chair/Home 
Office cyber threat team member, 2 private sector cyber specialists and 3 external academics (1 from the Free 
University, Amsterdam and 2 from Northumbria University), in addition to the 5 permanent Northumbria 
University research team members and 2 of the co-authors, now independent researchers, during their 
postgraduate studies at the University. 
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Ultimately, eleven issues emerged from the workshop discussions as significant barriers to 
the Police Service successfully engaging with the digital world, eleven ‘taproots’ of the 
problem tree with interlinked lateral roots. 
 
A visual problem tree, however, has yet to be developed. The normal procedure when using 
these techniques would be to conduct the problem tree workshop over a period of three or 
more days. This was beyond the resources available to this project and the time that could 
be spared from the participants’ professional duties. 
 
Despite these constraints, the workshop discussions about barriers to the effective policing 
of cybercrime resulted in the identification of ‘eleven tap roots’ that we organise here as 
two broad sets of issues The first group (themes 1. 1-1.7 in Table 1 below) have a resonance 
beyond the police or other cyber investigatory organisations themselves because of how 
they touch on general technological, legal and societal considerations, including the 
identification and dissemination of good practice concerning the interrelationship between 
police officers with investigators from other organisations or victims etc. The second set 
(themes 2.1 -2.4 in Table 1 below) is internal to the investigators’ own organisations. These, 
in line with two of the other contributions to this special issue (Brants et al. and Wilson), are 
concerned ultimately with the significance of professional culture in inhibiting or limiting the 
selection of available options to adjust to external change of a scientific or technological 
origin. The first set of issues is summarised and related to the research team’s observations 
during other research activities, academic or other relevant literature in Table 1, while the 
second set, dealing with questions that have been (comparatively) neglected by 
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researchers, is reserved for a more detailed consideration and reflection. Every effort has 
been made to ensure that the participants’ views (chiefly by direct quotations from the 
workshop record taken and circulated to participants being italicised) are clearly 
distinguishable from commentary originating within the research team, but there is some 
duplication of the participants’ comments because some of these cut across several of the 
issues on which this analysis is structured. 
 
Table 1. Identified barriers and overview 
 
Theme Overview of the barriers  
1.1 The data itself and the 
capacity to examine it 
Workshop participants considered that data management 
is becoming much more difficult with increasing volume 
and complexity. This was coupled with an apprehension 
(observed by the research team at both the workshop and 
at other police discussions)41 that technological change is 
outpacing law enforcement capabilities.  
 
The research team has noted at several NPPCC sponsored 
events a considerable reliance on the private sector (plus 
 
41 Chiefly at Chatham House Rule events organised by the NPCC on 22-25 October 2018 and 19-21 November 
2019, and by City Forum on 24 October 2019. 
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persuasive marketing promoting this), but participants 
were alert to the fact that potential contractors’ capability 
to access data is not matched by the legal authority to do 
so.  
 
Also the research team has had considerable experience of 
working with specialist police staff engaged in international 
cooperation, but it is clear (from our fieldwork in general) 
that the borderless nature of cybercrime means that 
investigatory staff who lack international experience will 
increasingly have to deal with potentially cross-
jurisdictional offending without the same level of training 
or mutual support42 (either in or across jurisdictions), that 
we have observed in other contexts. At the workshop this 
resulted in participants discussing concerns about (a) the 
possible significance of different national rules about and 
 
42 Mutual support prior to Brexit primarily consisted chiefly of investigative resources, information sharing and 
assistance with issues arising through significant variation in national laws through Europol and Eurojust, 
Justice Committee, Implications of Brexit for the justice system (HC 2016-17 750) at paras 11-13. With Brexit 
policing in general will lose much of this support, but initially expertise and established bi-lateral links will 
lessen the impact. 
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(b) the lack of transnational laws to assist access to data 
stored in different jurisdictions. 
1.2 Crime reporting It was common ground between workshop attendees and 
the research team that criminal justice statistics are 
notoriously unreliable,43 but we learned that that the 
measurement of cybercrime is particularly difficult.44 Under 
reporting seemed to be a common theme, influenced by 
factors such as victims’ embarrassment arising from having 
been a victim of fraud, though it was suggested by 
participants that there was also a risk of report bias, 
possibly as a result of gaming (performance statistic 
manipulation) to influence resource allocation.45  
1.3 Victim support and 
investigative intrusiveness 
Opinions differed among workshop participants about 
whether victim support is better for the standard 
 
43 For example, see: T. Newburn, Criminology (Willan: Uffculme, 2007) 49-80. 
44 Wilson in this issue touches on the misleading use of data and its highly provisional nature. 
45 R. Patrick, 'Public Champions or Protectors of Professional Interests?' Observations on the Performance of 
those Bodies Entrusted with the Regulation of The Police Service during the Era of New Public Management’ 
(2011) 84 Police J. 344. 
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conventional (non-commercial46) crime response or crimes 
involving data breaches. Concern focused on the potential 
intrusiveness into the victim’s private life47 and the 
inadequacy of the response to fraud and some other 
cybercrimes. 
1.4 Prevention: cybercrime 
reach, awareness and 
responsibility to 
lead/contribute to harm 
reduction  
Originating as a participant discussion about crime 
prevention, three different strands emerged: 
(a) The reach and incidence of cybercrime is much greater 
than any pre-digital criminological phenomena because of 
a quotidian reliance on the web in most people’s lives.  
(b) There is a major education gap that applies to 
individuals of all ages, including the older generation who 
are getting Wi-Fi and iPads etc. without necessarily 
understanding how this might increase their vulnerability 
to crime especially if they do not realise how extensive and 
informative their electronic footprint can quickly become. 
 
46 The response to a burglary at commercial premises would be different to such an event at the victim’s 
home. 
47 The workshop took place against the background of recent intense political scrutiny and government 
concern about the police scrutiny of the complainant’s and accused’s social media data in rape or other 
serious sexual offence allegations, Justice Committee, Disclosure of evidence in criminal cases (HC 2017–19 
859). 
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Though, not surprisingly, young people were seen as most 
at risk, because of insufficient understanding of what might 
constitute an offence (e.g. disrupting a friend’s internet 
connection) and the risk of harm from participation in 
online videogames. 
(c) There is uncertainty about the potential source of 
authority to initiate action for cross-sector working (e.g. 
police and education bodies) and a poor awareness, 
including among senior technology industry managers, at a 
senior level of society of responsibility for reducing the risk 
of harm from cybercrime.48 
 
1.5 Best Practice The fundamental problem is that it is unclear within the 
highly decentralised English policing system ‘who gets to 
decide what best practice is’.49 Workshop participants 
appreciated that the limited amount of shared information 
 
48 Wilson in this issue examines failures within the ITC industry to contribute to harm reduction and within 
government to require such action from the industry. 
49 See also Brants et al. in this issue for a comparison of cyber policing informed by centralised guidance in the 
Netherlands compared with England and Wales. 
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and case law50 relating to cybercrime makes it difficult to 
settle guidelines on best practice. Lack of a jurisdiction-
wide framework to support the gathering and 
dissemination of information about good decisions and 
practices is likely to explain why there is an absence of 
coherence in the current approaches being taken by 
different police forces government law enforcement 
agencies. Much emphasis was placed on the desirability 
that practitioners themselves should be involved in writing 
operational procedures etc. (including contributing to 
Forensic Science Regulator guidance) and to provide space 
(particularly important in a perceived ‘blame culture’) for 
experimentation and fresh thinking. 
1.6 Jurisdiction in 
cyberspace 
This theme proved to be the most difficult for workshop 
participants to discuss. This is largely because of the 
 
50 The research team observed at Chatham House Rule events organised by the NPCC on 22-25 October 2018 
and 19-21 November 2019 (a) that clear and consistent guidance about compliance with the law relating to 
surveillance was provided on both occasions by an IPCO inspector and that between the two meetings a new 
emphasis had emerged on case study presentations in response to attendee feedback. Regrettably Home 
Office funding for the dedicated NPCC post that made these events so helpful for cross-force/agency mutual 
learning and national development, including beyond the conferences themselves, ended in 2020. Also 
attendees’ police forces and agencies had to fund commercial conference fees. 
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considerable legal uncertainties relating to this issue.51 The 
group were fully seized of the importance of jurisdiction 
and their general consensus that the UK took a much more 
flexible approach to allowing access to data than the USA 
was consistent with expert analysis of public judicial 
scrutiny given to police equipment interference operations 
in that jurisdiction52 compared with England and Wales. In 
this respect the significance of the need to apply 
proportionality tests in individual investigations was fully 
appreciated by the workshop participants, but, as noted 
earlier, there was considerable support for agreements 
that would create a much more standardised framework 
internationally governing police access to data. 53 
 
51 See Davies in this issue for a consideration of some jurisdictional problems in the context of police work on 
ACNs/the ‘dark web’. 
52 S.D. Brown, ‘Hacking for evidence: the risks and rewards of deploying malware in pursuit of justice’ (2020) 
20 ERA Forum:423. 
53 The discussion, however, did not touch upon a related issue – how differences in national laws, for instance 
how the defences to sexual grooming vary from country to country (e.g. in respect of intent to seek a physical 
meeting and how this could have significant evidence gathering implications), noted by the research team 
during a case study presentation at a Chatham House Rule event organised 19-21 November 2019. 
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1.7 Privacy and fair trial 
Convention rights  
The discussion at various points touched on privacy and fair 
trial Convention rights54, but participants looked at this in 
terms of likely a public misconception rather than a legal 
perspective: 
(a) Many people think that the police regularly monitor 
Facebook accounts and would find such surveillance 
acceptable. 
(b) Concern was expressed about the abilities of a jury to 
correctly understand the reliability of digital evidence and, 
with echoes of the alleged  ‘CSI effect,’55 might expect to 
see digital evidence presented in court while failing to 
understand when this might not be possible or relevant.  
 
54 ECHR Art. 6 and Art. 8. 
55 A highly contestable assumption that juries (mainly or exclusively in the USA) will only convict if forensic 
science supports the prosecution case, S.A, Cole and R. Dioso-Villa, ‘CSI and its effects: Media, juries, and the 
burden of proof’ (2007).41 New England Law Review 435; S.A, Cole and R. Dioso-Villa, ‘Investigating the “CSI 
effect” effect: Media and litigation crisis in criminal law’ (2009) 61 Stanford Law Review 1335; S.A. Cole and R. 
Dioso Should judges worry about the “CSI effect”? (2011) 47 Court Review 20; S.A, Cole, ‘A surfeit of science: 
The “CSI effect” and the media appropriation of the public understanding of science’ (2015) 24 Public 
Understanding of Science 130. 
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2.1 Management,  
leadership and 
organisational ethos 
 
2.2 Over complication and 
exaggerated distinctions 
between policing in the 
physical and cyber worlds 
 
2.3 Ethics  
2.4 Knowledge, training and 
development 
 
 
2.1. Management and Leadership and organisational ethos 
 
It emerged from the workshop discussions that there are major questions about whether 
the existing management structure, ethos and tools available to senior staff (including 
status recognition, pay and career progression) is suitable for facilitating the changes 
needed to enable police forces to adjust to new ways of working required in response to 
cybercrime. This view is not a criticism of the management structure itself, but more 
frustration that direct knowledge and experience of cybercrime policing is insufficiently 
influential in decision making. (‘The management structure is fine, but the skills and 
leadership style …. don’t keep up to the fast paced world we live in, .… need a more bottom-
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up approach than what exists now.’56) This problem might reflect how today’s police force 
senior managers are of the wrong age to have had the opportunity to become involved in 
cybercrime investigations at the early stages of their career and, faced with more politically 
immediate issues ranging from fiscal austerity to counter-terrorism, would be unlikely to 
have sufficient time to develop a genuine appreciation of the problems faced by cybercrime 
investigators. Alternatively, it could reflect more fundamental weaknesses within police 
force management. For example, the general lack of detective experience at very senior 
levels of police management has been criticised even by a chief constable as a barrier to 
adaptation to respond to scientific or technological change.57 The highly fragmented nature 
 
56 Participant WS1J. 
57 A chief constable speaking at a time when forensic genetics were the most testing scientific and 
technologically driven changes that senior officers had to manage, commented how because ‘many senior 
officers never become involved in serious crime investigations,’ they were unable to make well informed 
strategic and financial decisions about how policing could best adapt to the opportunities that scientific 
advances offered, D. Coleman, ‘Beyond DNA in the UK - the police perspective’ in (eds.) M. Townsley and G. 
Laycock, Forensic Science Conference Proceedings : beyond DNA in the UK – Integration and Harmonisation 
(Home Office: London, 2004) 9. As one of the participants (WS1A) observed: ‘no chief constable has worked in 
a cybercrime team and they don’t need to, but they need to have some knowledge on the area.’ Such problems 
may be intensified by organisational culture at lower levels within the police hierarchy; ‘If you don’t know 
something about a digital crime – if you go up the ranks then you don’t tell people that you don’t know 
something because it becomes seen as your weakness and may hinder your chance of getting promoted.', 
WS1H. 
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of English police organisation58 inevitably means that there are no cyber-disciplinary 
specialists with high level managerial authority at either a national or regional level; how the 
power to implement transformational change is concentrated in the hands of senior officers 
approaching the end of their career.59 Also the creation of directly elected police and crime 
commissioners60 is likely to make it more difficult for policing to develop strategy in contrast 
to policy setting with an eye to the local electorate that generally cares far less about 
seemingly remote cybercrime than nuisance neighbours.61 
 
In terms, however, of the daily experience of investigating cybercrime three core issues 
provided the focus for discussion among workshop participants: 
1. a risk-averse culture within policing; 
 
58 See Brants et al. in this issue. 
59 ‘The leadership layer is less likely to take risks for transformational change because they will retire and not 
reap the rewards of these changes …’ Participant WS1A 
60Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. 
61 M. Levi speaking about public perceptions of local priorities versus transnational organised crime threats , 
commented that ‘what a lot of people want out of the police is local attention’ and how police legitimacy and 
political power ultimately depends on delivering what the public wants, quoted in A. Perry, ‘Britain’s Police are 
losing the battle against rampant organised crime. Can anyone turn it around?’ The Guardian 2, 22 November 
2018 11. 
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2. the hierarchical structures of police forces and the warranted officer/civilian staff 
distinction; and  
3. a lack of cybercrime experience or knowledge at operational as well as senior 
leadership levels.  
A deeply engrained risk-averse culture within policing is often manifested as a blame culture 
that threatens individual careers and opportunities to contribute to investigative work, 
whether the avoided risk (and subsequent blame) is personal judgement or conduct, legal 
error, or reputational (personal and organisational)62. Managers and leaders often avoid risk 
in conventional policing, but this tendency is more pronounced with cybercrime policing 
because of its non-conventional environment, not the ‘well-trodden ground’ of traditional 
policing.63 The following quote illustrates the reluctance management have when faced with 
risk: 
 
62 R. Heaton, ‘We Could Be Criticized! Policing and Risk Aversion’, Policing (2011) 5 
75<https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paq013>; T. Green and A. Gates, ‘Understanding the Process of 
Professionalisation in the Police Organisation’ The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles (2014) 87 75 
<https://doi.org/10.1350/pojo.2014.87.2.662>; P. A. J. Waddington, ‘Police Pursuits: A Case Study of “Critical 
Friendship”?’, Policing (2010) 41 19 <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pap057>; B. Loveday, ‘Performance 
Management and the Decline of Leadership within Public Services in the United Kingdom’, Policing (2008) 2 
120  <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pam070>; R. Worden and S. McLean. Police Departments as 
Institutionalized Organizations in Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy in (eds.) R. 
Worden and S. McLean (Berkley: University of California Press 2017) 
63 Participant WS1A. 
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‘“I’d be criticised if…..” - this viewpoint holds them back because they do not do what 
they necessarily should do.’64 
This discourse was labelled as ‘hindsight policing’ by the workshop participants to describe 
the unwillingness of managers to make certain decisions because of concern about future 
scrutiny. It was also seen as directly inhibiting the testing of new working methods or even 
the application of training received by police staff: 
‘It comes back to a risk-averse culture – they don’t want to take a new approach. … A 
guy goes back to the office after cyber training - “no we’re not doing this” when 
they approach senior managers’65 
This quote demonstrates a relationship between age, rank, specialist knowledge and risk-
aversion within the police.  
 
The close interrelationship of risk-aversion and hierarchical management styles was also 
linked by at least one participant with leadership tending to come from an older ‘safer’ 
generation with warranted officer status and a less inclusive attitude than younger 
generations of officers. Both characteristics were seen as detrimental to the kind of 
leadership needed for the creation of investigative teams with higher levels of cyber 
investigative skills: 
 
64 Participant WS1H. 
65 Participant WS1L. 
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– so easy to say they can bring in outside people with specialist skills, but you have to 
have an environment where these skills are nurtured and these just are not.’ 66 
This was also linked with career progression, pay and frustration at the lack of capabilities. 
This could further erode the ability of the police to respond to cybercrime when staff might 
easily be lost to the private sector where both rewards and the working environment might 
be more attractive cyber savvy staff: 
‘Policing is missing a trick; they need progression because people get the 
qualifications and then go private places because they can earn double …. We 
investigate fraud, but as soon as it involves ACN, we have no capabilities.’67 
What was said at the workshop also indicated a need for a change in the traditional police 
management and team working styles:  
‘Management and leadership need to change …. the police fall-back on command 
and control and there isn’t particularly a collaborative approach in the policing 
world.68 
 
66 Participant WS1A. 
67 Participant WS1C. 
68 Participant WS1B. 
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Again these very personal concerns intersect with fundamental questions about the 
fragmented structure of English policing: ‘career progression within one organisation [police 
force] is limited.’69 
 
Whilst the first two issues might apply to policing more generally, the final management and 
leadership point discussed by workshop participants is specific to cybercrime policing and 
resonates with the comments noted earlier about the lack of knowledge about such work 
within police management and leadership tiers. This arose from a discussion about the rare 
matching of leadership and digital expertise. There were no easy short term solutions to this 
question, but, conventional organisational change policies (not a point made by the 
participants) - cyber focused career pathways and better support for individual staff 
development, specialist recruitment and retention packages, and changes in remuneration - 
might all be suitable for strengthening police cybercrime investigative capabilities and 
capacity. 
 
2.2 Over-complication and exaggerated distinctions between policing in the physical and 
cyber worlds 
 
 
69 Participant  WS1A. 
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A major theme that emerged repeatedly during participant discussion was the deceptive 
separation or exaggerated distinction frequently made between cyber and conventional 
policing. Much to the research team’s surprise, this was identified as a core barrier to 
change. The warnings against allowing the development of a silo attitude to cyber policing 
are not inconsistent with the ideas for empowering and rewarding technical expertise and 
knowledge in the previous section. It is concerned with how those specialist skills should fit 
within the deontological, legal and institutional framework of modern policing. 
 
A ‘silo approach’ springs from two misconceptions. Firstly, there is an internal belief that 
cybercrime policing or ‘the digital’ is infinitely more complex than conventional policing. 
Secondly, there is a separation between digital and conventional policing due to the lack of 
sound frameworks within the digital side of policing compared to the more conventional 
police work such as stop and search, or investigating burglaries or violence. Workshop 
participants suggested that procedural frameworks for traditional areas of policing were 
clear, historic and everybody ‘knew their role because they were on ‘well-trodden ground’. 
However, the governance structure of the 43 police forces model and the limited cyber 
experience of senior officers were not less familiar with digital policing compared with the 
conventional policing experienced earlier in their career, with many, particularly senior 
investigators taking,70 as one participant put it, an ’I don’t do digital stance’.71 Investigators 
 
70 Participant WS1A. 
71 Participant WS1B. 
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inexperienced in digital policing were unwilling to act outside their areas of experiential 
knowledge; to do so would create discomfort and this now manifests itself in a deceptive 
separation between digital and conventional policing. In contrast workshop participants 
tended to the view that, while the digital badge makes some of their colleagues wary: 
‘online surveillance isn’t actually that different to offline surveillance.’72 
 
 The same crimes that occur in real space occur in cyberspace and digital crimes are just a 
different environment to traditional policing areas. The attempted differentiation was seen 
as ‘a false separation’.73  
” 
This theme of over-complication and creation of silos was repeated throughout the day, 
being particularly apparent in discussion about the final two core themes, ethical policing 
and knowledge and training. 
 
2.3 Ethics 
 
 
72 Participant WS1B 
73 Participant WS1J. 
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The publication of the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics (2001)74 marked the 
growing importance of this issue politically, but also professional engagement with a series 
of major reports: Nolan on standards in public life (1995), Macpherson (1999) on the death 
of Stephen Lawrence and Patten about policing in Northern Ireland (1999).75 Further 
impetus to improve the understanding of ethical conduct in policing in terms of wider 
conduct may have been delayed, however, by uncertainty and major changes in the law on 
fundamental rights and tort, with the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECtHR’s controversial 
decision in 2000 (Osman76) until reversed in 200277 that engaged Convention rights (Art.6) 
with the law of tort relating to police investigations. 78 Uncertainty about the application of 
tort persisted, however, until calmly restated by the Supreme Court in Robinson as ‘the 
ordinary common law duty of care to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable injury to persons 
and reasonably foreseeable damage to property’.79 In the face of these numerous and 
complex developments, not surprisingly, Flanagan (2008) found that the police had become 
 
74 Council of Europe, Rec(2001)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 19 
September 2001 and explanatory memorandum < https://polis.osce.org/european-code-police-ethics > 
accessed 15 May 2020. 
75 Ibid. at 673. 
76 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
77 Z v United Kingdom (2000) 34 EHRR 245. 
78 Given statutory recognition under the Police Act 1996 s. 88. 
79 Robinson (Appellant) v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (Respondent) [2018] UKSC 4 at [69]. 
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‘risk- averse’ and needed to move on to become ‘risk-conscious’, 80 from what has been 
noted above from the workshop discussions this has not been achieved, at least in the 
policing of cybercrime. 
 
The Police Code of Conduct81 that was introduced in 1999 failed to address the ethical 
complexity of policing. This short document is a remarkably basic list, ranging from 
fundamental concepts, such as honesty, the reasonable use of force and the protection of 
confidential information, to corporate standards of behaviour such as sobriety when on 
duty and always being ‘well turned out’. This topic of interest and concern for a number of 
years only comparatively recently came to the fore in English policing. In 2014, the College 
of Policing published a formal code of ethics in their drive to establish professionalisation of 
the Police Service and improve standards of professional behaviour82. It has legal force as a 
 
80 R. Flanagan, Final Report of the Independent Review of Policing (Home Office: London, 2008) paras 5.24 and 
5.63. 
81 The Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/730, sch 1. 
82 College of Policing, Code of Ethics: A Code of Practice for the Principles and Standards of Professional 
Behaviour for the Policing Profession of England and Wales (Coventry, 2014);  S. Holdaway. The Re-
Professionalisation of the Police in England and Wales. (2017) Criminology and Criminal Justice 17 588. 
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code of practice made by the Home Secretary for promoting the efficiency and effectiveness 
generally of English and Welsh police forces,83  
 
Development of the code of ethics is one strand of a binary strategy to achieve 
‘professionalisation’ or more accurately ‘re-professionalisation’ of the Police Service,84 the 
second being the transition of officer recruitment and training from sole police activity to all 
graduate entry via degree apprenticeships in policing (akin to the approach developed a 
little earlier for nursing) and now in place. Another significant change occurred in the police 
disciplinary system on 1 February 2020 as new conduct regulations85 came in to force 
together with new performance regulations (covering unsatisfactory performance, 
attendance and gross incompetence).86 
 
These new conduct regulations bring about considerable change in dealing with 
unacceptable conduct with an important and new distinction between ‘misconduct’ or 
‘gross misconduct’, and professionally inadequate performance described as ‘practice 
 
83 Under the Police Act 1996 (as amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 s 124) s 
39A. 
84 S. Holdaway, above n. 82.  
85 The Police, England and Wales (Conduct) Regulations SI 2020/4 (conduct regulations). 
86 The Police England and Wales (Performance) Regulations 2020 SI 202/ 3. 
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requiring improvement’87. This is defined in the conduct regulations as ‘underperformance 
or conduct not amounting to misconduct or gross misconduct, which falls short of the 
expectations of the public and the police service as set out in the “Code of Ethics” issued by 
the College of Policing …’ 88 
 
These changes were marked by an interesting meeting of minds with the Home office press 
release stressing the intention of making ‘the discipline system more proportionate’ and 
encouraging ‘a much greater emphasis on learning from mistakes’.89 With the Police 
Federation equally positive about the significance of the changes, in a statement that places 
the concerns expressed by workshop participants about the police blame culture and risk-
aversion as pervasive failings of institutional culture within the police that the new 
arrangements would address: 
After many previous reforms and incarnations of the conduct regulations the Home 
Office has listened to our concerns and created a process to try and embed learning, 
performance culture into policing. The whole “blame culture” – a belief that any 
deviation from the standards of Professional Behaviour has to be put through a 
 
87 Conduct regulations reg 2 
88.Ibid. . 
89 Home Office, Home Office overhauls police complaints and discipline process, press release 10 January 2020  
< https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-overhauls-police-complaints-and-discipline-process > 
accessed 2 March 2020. 
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misconduct process – belongs in the past. There needs to be a shift in mind-set 
whereby forces are alive to the fact that mistakes, errors or poor working practice 
can be corrected and learned from -not just by the individual but by the whole 
service - and learnt from quickly.90 
Ethics is now a major NPCC work stream whose task, reflecting the organisation’s  strategic 
leadership role within the highly decentralised police service organisational structure, is to 
disseminate clear guidance, inter alia, about good investigative practice and the effective 
direction of such work, while ensuring that ethical decision making is used to improve 
professional standards, not least in addressing the institutional blame culture and risk 
aversion that inhibits the police from adapting to major societal and technological change 
such as the advent of high volume and high harm cybercrime.  
 
It became evident from workshop discussion that this major police reform strategy based on 
ethics, not just in terms of individual conduct, but as an attempt, as the Police Federation 
expressed it, to ‘embed learning, performance culture into policing’ faces innumerable 
challenges even in our narrowly focused area of cybercrime investigations. One of the most 
interesting insights revealed by the workshop process was a dependence on technological 
tools and solutions developed in a market driven by commercial considerations in which 
 
90 Police Federation, Blame culture a thing of the past, press release 18 December 2019 
 < https://www.polfed.org/news-media/latest-news/2019/blame-culture-a-thing-of-the-past/ > accessed 2 
March 2020. 
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police procurement is often a less powerful presence than better resourced customers 
whose activities do not encompass anything like the ethical and legal complexity of criminal 
justice:  
Fundamentally the mismatch is between a technological approach to solutions which 
is driven by vendors of those solutions seeking a new market, which are often 
secondary markets from the original one. In terms of technological procurement, the 
policing market is small. A lot of the products that are adopted in policing come from 
separate entities. Example: anti-fraud tech is driven by the financial service industry 
and not the law enforcement community.91 
The same participant cited the example of attempts by the police to make use of automatic 
face recognition technology with inadequate independent scientific evaluation of the 
reliability of products and ethical governance over its potential application.  
Data volume, complexity and analytical techniques available through private sector tools 
and services also impact upon ethical conduct. Policing being almost totally reliant on 
analytical software from the private sector (but not purchased centrally for the Police 
Service) exposed  questions about  whether the police need to be more actively involved 
within setting requirements of such applications and understanding the data-driven 
analytical structure and methods.92 One participant confirmed that the police were now 
creating requirements for technology acquisition that were underpinned by ethical 
 
91 Participant WS1A 
92 This reflects workshop team’s strong general impression. 
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judgements.93 Though there were contrary concerns about the risk of ‘stifling innovation’94 
and a lack of understanding about the interrelationship between ethics technology and 
capability development as discussed at the workshop that could result in the issue not being 
addressed as the ethics framework is developed.95 There was also a perceived tension 
between involving private sector employees on police force ethics panels over potential 
conflict of interest and both avoiding over-dominance by the police96 and the problem of 
finding members with sufficient expertise.97 
 
The research team noted significant concern about the integrity with which the code of 
ethics could be applied within a digital world, which is changing so much faster than the 
Police service. In particular, the theme of operating within an untested ethical framework 
was discussed at length and brought out the sometimes ambiguous situation that digital 
investigators work within, particularly with jurisdictional uncertainty in the potentially 
digitally borderless context where evidence is ‘seen’ and ‘grabbed’, but where it is held, or 
by whom is not known. Investigators present acknowledged levels of ambiguity in their 
 
93 Participant WS1B. 
94 Participant WS1D. 
95 Participant WS1J. 
96 Participant WS1D. 
97 Participant WS1A. 
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work, feeding back to previous comments of separation between conventional policing 
(‘well-trodden ground’) and the digital world. 
 
The uncertain nature of the ethical code where it meets digital policing is inhibiting good 
policing according to the participants. Digital investigators need to feel comfortable ‘in the 
grey,’98 and this ambiguity prevents that. Whether untested conventional policing ethics 
would be fit for purpose for digital policing ethical practice became a significant question.  
Evidently, there are problems surrounding ethics that predominately centre upon ambiguity 
and a lack of understanding. Two views were expressed about renewing or reviewing the 
code of ethics for its application to cyberspace policing, one that it should be reviewed 
urgently, with one participant commenting that the code did not work because ‘culturally 
there is a lack of understanding of it’99 and another advocating delay in order to allow a 
code to develop organically through cyber policing cases and data. Fear expressed was that 
a contemporary review may halt progress and stop investigators moving towards what 
Flanagan had described as ‘risk-conscious’ decision making,100informed by decisions that are 
focused on identifying whether proposed actions are ethical and proportionate.101 In the 
meantime, some basic questions did not appear to have been adequately addressed in 
 
98 Participant WS1J. 
99 Ibid. 
100 R. Flanagan, above n.80 at paras 5.24 and 5.63. 
101 Participants WS1A, WS1J and WS1L. 
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guidance provided by police forces and other bodies, such as the circumstances in which 
hacking is legitimate,102 and RIPA could be portrayed as ‘overbearing’ and not understood as 
intended to ensure effective safeguards against the misuse of powers.103 There was 
however no dissent about the importance, implemented with the revised disciplinary code, 
of creating an effective link between ethically informed decision making and police 
discipline: 
There are still police officers making decisions based on good reasons but having the 
wrong outcome and then being disciplined.104 
 
2. 4 Knowledge, Training and Development 
 
Throughout the workshop discussion on this subject there was a recurring thread: the lack 
of understanding of digital policing and security among many police officers, other criminal 
justice system colleagues (especially in the CPS) and the public. Two issues considered 
already in this analysis are highly relevant to this problem, firstly police management, 
leadership and organisational ethos (issue 2.1) and secondly over-complication and 
exaggerated distinctions between policing in the physical and cyber worlds (issue 2.2). 
 
102Participant WS1D.  
103 Participant WS1A. 
104 Participant WS1J. 
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Neither the police nor the legal system appears to be particularly geared towards the digital 
world. Two examples of wasted and much needed training demonstrate flaws within the 
system. 
 
Participants discussed how the police often send officers on cyber security courses yet, 
despite the positive feedback, officers cannot implement their new knowledge and skills 
because leadership structures do not empower them to do so or a shortage of the right 
equipment means they cannot use the skills that they have acquired, suggesting a 
contradictory approach to efficient practice.105 Training is overwhelmingly aimed at ‘front 
line’ digital investigators, yet in serious crime, those investigators are task-driven by senior 
officers with limited knowledge. Insightful, high value and enquiring tasking is significantly 
impeded in an environment with limited levels of senior investigator knowledge, for 
example, in understanding how well-focused (to avoid digital saturation) data extraction 
from recovered phones might quickly open potential avenues of investigation that would 
otherwise be lost or slow to develop.106 However, this was not seen only as a police 
problem, rather as common throughout the criminal justice system:  
 CPS do not know much about digital evidence, this presents itself when at trial. If it 
can be managed without presenting evidence, then it gets parked somewhere else so 
 
105 Participants WS1J and WS1B. 
106 Participant WS1J. 
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they just use conventional evidence… if they don’t understand technology, they will 
not pursue that element of the case.107 
Likewise participants were concerned that society needs to be better educated about to 
come to terms with cybercrime to avoid seeing it as frightening and instead to be better 
prepared to directly reduce the risk of criminal harm themselves.108 
 
Questions were also raised about the organisation and scope of training. It was suggested 
that too much attention was being placed on training new recruits who would be already 
better educated in cyber-issues than exiting staff.109 At a more senior level, it was 
suggested, that more specialist advanced knowledge and training was required, particularly 
as the police did not have experts in probabilistic rather than deterministic data 
interpretation. This was coupled with the idea of promoting greater skill transfer by using 
networks to access knowledge and expertise from academia and business.110  
 
Much of what was discussed about staff training and development is reminiscent of the 
implementation of major changes in policing at the turn of the century with the introduction 
 
107 Ibid. 
108 Participants WS1A, WS1C and WS1F. 
109Participant WS1B. 
110Participant WS1A. 
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of the National Intelligence Model (NIM). That initiative created an immediate need for data 
and intelligence analysts to inform tactical and strategic resource decisions, skills that were 
not previously cultivated or sought within much of the Police Service and in a similar 
manner to a recurring problem discussed during the workshop: senior investigators did not 
necessarily have the analytical skills needed to make good use of this new capability. 
 
Over a relatively short period a trend towards the civilianisation of analytical posts was 
developed in all police forces. In order to challenge the rapid staff ‘churn’ of analytical 
positions from policing to the private sector and provide knowledge levels to allow 
evidential input of analytical products, a career pathways scheme was developed by the 
College of Policing’s predecessor, the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) resulting 
in the accreditation of specialist analytical skills. Most, if not all, police forces still operate 
such a professionalisation/accreditation route, and this model has been replicated where 
the College of Policing is currently operating a Cyber Digital Career Pathways Scheme for 
digital investigators together with a professional institution for such staff:  
 
The Cyber Digital Pathways Project has created a specialist profession for cyber and 
digital investigations specialists. The Institute of Cyber Digital Investigation 
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Professionals provides law enforcement agencies with recognition for specialist work 
performed on a daily basis.111. 
 
The professionalisation of these roles may be commendable and has reached a total cohort 
of approximately 400 in its 4 year life (to 2019), but the above description of the target 
group by including the term ‘on a daily basis’, denotes that it is aimed at constables and 
sergeants with  only a small number of inspectors. No senior investigators fall within the 
scheme. The workshop discussions identified a formidable knowledge gap between ‘daily 
business’ digital investigators and the senior investigators who task those officers. Such a 
knowledge gap has the potential to limit investigatory effectiveness with potentially 
damaging consequences for attempts to adapt policing to respond to cybercrime. Workshop 
discussions about this problem were not limited to the CPS and we also learned that 
defence teams equally have limited knowledge. Thus, what we were told about training and 
development needs has resonance for all professions within the criminal justice system and 
supports our earlier assumptions about the potential value of the workshop methodology 
beyond the Police service. 
 
Conclusions 
 
111 College of Policing, ‘Cyber Digital Career Pathways Scheme’, in Internet Intelligence & Investigations – From 
Frontline to Covert (College of Policing: Ryton, 2019. 
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From what the research team learned during the scoping exercise, conference attendance 
and workshops, and the 2019 workshop discussed above, it is clear that strong positive 
activity, collaborative working, partnership working and investment is taking place and 
being developed by the Police Service to respond to cybercrime, much of it being out of 
scope for this article. However, the process of functional adaptation is being impeded by 
significant internal institutional and cultural barriers. This was highlighted by the use of the 
problem tree tool as a facilitator of high value stakeholder led participatory research. 
 
The approach that we eventually followed, drawing on the somewhat niche Disaster 
Management area of study, was powerful and impactive, generating high levels of 
engagement from a professional service often known to be engagement reluctant and 
culturally closed. Westmarland & Rowe describe undertaking questionnaire based research 
with British police officers into officer perspectives on misconduct and unethical behaviour. 
It is of note in the context of this paper their comment made regarding only securing access 
to three forces ‘These were the only volunteers after a series of approaches and appeals to 
senior officers to give permission for their force to participate’.112 Questionnaires (11 page 
booklets) were sent to forces for internal distribution and return with no participatory or 
stakeholder-led engagement taking place. For the research reported here the need for close 
 
112L. Westmarland and M. Rowe, Police ethics and integrity: Can a new code overturn the blue code?, Policing 
& Society (2018) 28 854 <https://doi.org/10.1108/17410391111097438>. 
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participatory working to ensure positive and constructive engagement with (primarily) 
police officers/employees led to a significant level of knowledge exchange and the 
mitigation of bias. We suggest that the approach described in this article is a very effective 
for generating criminal justice (we do not believe that it is only useful for police focused 
research) stakeholder participatory involvement, because cultural and institutional barriers 
are significantly broken down when working with the police or other close-knit professionals 
in this way. Covid-19 permitting, we hope to be able to refine and develop this approach 
which is potentially of value - given that all participants in the legal system, certainly not just 
the police, often find it difficult to adapt scientific and technological advances - for 
understanding functional adaptation generally within criminal justice. 
 
Knowledge and training is  a fundamental pillar to achieving success in moving the Police 
Service firmly into the digital world, but that work needs to rapidly influence thinking across  
the complete Policing hierarchy, to move away from default ‘daily basis’ training and 
encompass all pinch points identified on the pathway to functional adaptation to the post 
digital world. Management grades driving forward looking, innovative and ethical digital 
investigations must be equipped with significant levels of knowledge sufficient for the ever 
changing world in which society now finds itself: a society that depends upon a professional 
Police Service that can meet its needs and requirements. The fundamental pillar for 
achieving a successful transition is the new approach to police conduct and performance. As 
citizens, who value the importance of policing with integrity and competence, we hope that 
the meeting of minds (the Police Federation, senior officers, police and crime 
commissioners and the Home Office) augers well for the potential contribution of the new 
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arrangements to an eventually successful functional adaptation by the police to the digital 
or post digital age, but our judgement, based on the workshop experience, is not to take 
such an outcome for granted. 
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